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THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE MYTH: UNPLEASANT DUAL CHOICE 
BETWEEN THE NATO AND EU   
 
The successful end of the Cold war and accent of democratic values and market economies has given us 
an unparalleled opportunity to shape, with others, a safer, freer, more prosperous world. The challenge for 
our democracies during the first decade of the new millennium is to sustain our success and defense new 
dangers. In the 21 st century we must deepen our transatlantic partnership to sustain this cooperation. A 
strengthened European Security and Defense Identity is central to this vision, as the success of NATO’s ini-
tiative to enhance Europe’s defense capabilities. The only way to provide security for our people in the dec-
ade ahead is to exercise leadership together for the interests and values we share. 
Bill CLINTON  
                 President of the United States of America 
ABSTRACT: 
In this article we argued in detail the major issues after globalization process and collapse of the Soviet Union 
which results end of the Cold War era on the Transatlantic agenda to assess how each might influence the overall 
European relationship in the future of European Defense myth. Specifically, we assessed the state of the Europe-
an collective security debate on development of policy options on NATO and EU relations. We also tried to un-
derstand the concept and plan of action for ESDI-European Security and Defense Identity and Policy in order to 
assess what the future might look like from a Transatlantic perspective. This paper will try to explain to divide has 
three aspects: First, differences in the general attitude towards a “globalization” effects of NATO and EU; Sec-
ondly, the timing and implications of future enlargement of NATO and EU institutions possibly 2005 the im-
pact of various policy options on future Transatlantic security relationships. And finally, we discussed possible 
developments and framework of possible crisis areas and new threats in proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction and defense alternatives against to ballistic missile threats.   
Why have I looked at the matter in this vision? Because, in spite of the positive transformation process in 
macro level power balances and security concern in European concern, there are non- – changing determinants. 
First, in spite of the NATO Treaty Article V missions have changed with general peace keeping operations priori-
ties, proliferation of WMD-Weapons of Mass Destruction’s around the NATO borders. In this regard Turkey is 
under the big pressure of WMD and its critical deliver systems with ballistic missile threat. Secondly, in contrary 
to conventional capacity of EU security dimensions, since its capacity his very difficult to answer against the 
WMD threat unless the US nuclear deterrence guarantee and early warning capabilities continue, is not easy to 
discriminate possible conflicts. Thirdly, Turkey considering blockading himself from the new European Security 
concern in spite of his possible bridge mission Prof. Bağcı stressed that either pivotal or multi-regional power 
roles in changing Eurasia geopolitical balances.    
INTRODUCTION: 
Globalization is forcing every institution one to rethink of all the security strategies and defense policymak-
ing studies. As is true in other areas, international community is still coming to estimates to build a possible con-
sensus with what real parameters globalization is and what it means for foreign and defense policy, and how 
strategic studies and policymakers need to reorient their traditional ways of thinking and working in an increas-
ingly globalize world. They would bring together “soft” and “hard” power, to use Joseph Nye’s terminology, as 
part of a grander strategy for shaping a new international system [1]. ‘The new organizing principles of regional 
and global security are democracy, good governance and the rule of law. There are close relationships between 
globalization and international security, on the one hand, and democratization, human rights and respect for the 
rights of minorities, on the other. In the 21st century democracy should be seen not only as a form of govern-
ment but also as a way towards the peaceful coexistence of nations. Whole these new features are often summed 
up in a phenomenon called globalization, which can be defined as the international interaction of information, fi-
nancial capital, commerce, technology, and even labor at exponentially greater speeds.  
The proliferation of international organizations, institutions, the great impact of government policies both 
at internal and external policies, cultural differences, and evolving security considerations demand that we under-
stand globalization before we can determine the optimum course to steer. The beginning of the XXI century has 
been filled with such striking new features that few can avoid the allure and burden of seriously examining and 
pondering their implications. In this regard, since the end of the Cold War the pace of contemporary diplomatic 
activities have developed more significant roles for organized more complex dialogues that have resulted in a col-
lapse of ideological hostilities in and around the EUROPE. This dialogue is also creating an additional layer of 
diplomacy in which non-state actors such as universities, research institutes, NGO’s, IGO’s positively communi-
cate both with states and associations of states, and other actors learning the art and practice of diplomacy. 
This new environment is already having a dramatic effect on domestic and international business, as well as 
on collective security policies - especially about the changing liberal democratic environment- in European conti-
nent between the NATO and EU beyond the Cold War also enhanced the principles of ’Democratic actors don’t 
fight each other’’. To develop a better understanding of the phenomenon of globalization and its implications to 
examine and debate the attributes and effects of globalization on national security and peace for around the Euro-
pean geostrategic axes [2]. Europe living radical and dramatic changes in over the recently 15 years, particular-
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ly political, economic and in the field of security. However, at the same time three things are affected in security 
issues. First, Europe after changing security environment wants to gain its previous political, military and eco-
nomic power again with his Europe can defense by the Europeans strategy, which remarked by the general De 
Gaulle vision. This reality brings decrease the defense budgets more than 100 billion dollars, Ambassador Oymen 
remarks and military readiness capabilities. Also, Jeffrey GEDMIN explained  “Less Independence’s” trends be-
tween the Europe and traditional transatlantic link.  This important development results a new bargaining be-
tween the US and EU defense expenditure and modernization discussions especially after new allies participated 
to the NATO alliance Mr. Anthony BLINKEN stressed this issue. Second, ethnic nationalist activation has results 
critical new conflicts, which created new threats in regional security agenda. Third, Russia preferred its own se-
curity policy strategies by non- participation NATO and ESDI enlargement process since there is no response 
Primus Inter Pares demands in spite of his large defense machinery system. 
1. EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND TRANSFORMATION PROCESS:   
Internationally, the dramatic opening of societies and states in the international system has also been a dou-
ble-edged sharp Persian sword. That is an important point to make because, even the improving the prospects for 
the successful transition to democracy and market-based economics with highly positive developments in a mac-
ro-sense, but in contrary there is also emergence of new threats, risks, and vulnerabilities such as separate nation-
alism, ethnic conflicts, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, international terrorism, and illegal drug traffics. 
It's a question that has ignited a tense struggle about the European Defense policy and strategic affairs thinking 
between the NATO and EU the region and beyond. It is a real phenomenon that managing the implications of the 
break-up of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the seemingly never-ending conflicts in the Bal-
kans, increasing Western norms and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and expanding and reforming the 
North Atlantic Alliance are just some of the issues that require transformation in their stability’s. There are differ-
ent following questions and uncertainties about the European Security futures, which will be       shaped in way of 
future:   
• Will this transformation be accelerated through NATO expansion, or will it be held back? 
• What is the real purpose of the EU’s new security policy? Is Europe’s goal to take on a larger geography or 
cultural identity norms share of the defense burden?  
• The decision of the EU to craft a common security and defense policy will not duplicate the role of the 
NATO or drive a wider cooperation between Europe and the Transatlantic Link? 
• How do European States and Transatlantic Community compare to where we are today and new proposals 
to restructure and expand the scope of to manage the strategic challenges of futures threats? 
• Will NATO expansion lead to a build-up of anti-Western feeling or are the global pull so strong that it 
doesn't matter?  
• Will Russia feel isolated and offended or will see its advantage in the competition between the NATO and 
EU cooperation?  
• Is it possible to close the possible gap between the non – EU members NATO Allies “in-Europe agenda” – 
the creation of a Europe whole and free in alliance? 
• What kind of defense policies would Allies ideally want to have for European Security policies? 
The possible ideal answer to these entire questions is that we must can open the dialogue channels clearly. It 
is always easier to analyze what is wrong or missing in current policy than to come up with the answer. In ideal 
academic dimension, the general aim of this paper has not been to only criticize. Can we image wider and more 
comprehensive which should eliminate separatism in European and what can be done in order to prevent the de-
fense issue from becoming a decisively dividing issue for the Atlantic Alliance. However, that will happen only if 
allies on both sides of the Atlantic share a broad vision of their future together. It remains to be seen if such a vi-
sion exists. The future of NATO will be easier to discern when the answers to those questions are clear. It is un-
certain how Europe will use its new cohesiveness and fledgling power [3]. 
In the past, generally states involved in international politics, particularly those in wars, have commonly 
sought alliances or alignments to reinforce their power and influence considering power balances in European 
Concert. WW-II disaster has changed about the war and its destruct power ideas. In other words, the parties have 
searched the effective peaceful institutions instead of the conflict, which margined conventional weapon systems 
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki disasters. Perhaps the deepest vital mission of NATO was in making it clear that 
the establishment democratic defense barrier after WW-II in deployment with U.S. nuclear military deterrence and 
economic power on European map would not be repeated in another Soviet Red Army engagement affecting the 
European balance. 
2. THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND CHANGING BALANCE OF SECURITY 
DEFENSE IDENTITY ON NATO AND EU MANDATE:  
Today, in the first picture there is no doubt, after Cold War era, European Security concert continue to chang-
es, but perhaps the agenda remains the same: it is to preserve peace and security and to promote freedom and 
democratic ideals which termed in NATO Treaty. Today The Europe again have critical choices before turning 
point to new to make the choices, also estimate the potentials of  sharing the risks and the responsibilities for 
common peaceful ideals in diplomatic long ways. Following the upheaval of WW- I, France built the Maginot 
Line to nail down peace and stability in Europe, once and for all, by guarding against future attacks from the 
Germans. Now, 75 years later, we go the same route-and again circumstances have changed radically. In keeping 
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with everything else, in the 50 years since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded, what was 
then focused on Europe now has become global. America-with ties to Europe [4]. 
The new European Order is founded on concepts like rule of law globalization, multipolarity, national, 
sub-regional or regional interests communitarisation, integration and identities that define the structure of the Eu-
ropean regional sub-system in relation to state behavior an interaction. The question of self-determination, seces-
sion, and claims, of national minorities has dramatically reposed by political developments in Eastern Europe. The 
question of national minorities reinforced the uti possidetis principle of international laws as a territorial sover-
eignty and integrity, and the principles of political unity of the state. Furthermore, the official views and posi-
tions expressed about minorities and their treatment are often contradictory on a theoretical level, but more so on 
the level of state policy. A new era of cooperation and of mutually beneficial economic and technical relations 
among the southeastern European countries has opened up since the transition of most of these countries to market 
economies.  
Whole these changing strategic realities mean that this century will require new vision and greater wisdom. 
Cooperative structures of the EU and NATO both are essential for the Euro-Atlantic community. Order. In Bos-
nia in 1995, and again because of Kosovo in 1999, American – led NATO forces, albeit with some broader inter-
national participation, enforced an end to war [5]. After NATO leaders meeting in Madrid in July 1997 agreed that 
NATO should remain open to future members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty with process at a 
summit meeting in 2002.   This was a compromise formula for the European states, which supported the entry of 
Balkans, and Baltic States should be second wave round of enlargement. Since Madrid prospective members, 
notably the Baltic States, have actively tried to persuade NATO to move swiftly to a next round of enlargement. 
Increasingly, NATO diplomats are speaking under policy on further enlargement. It would be imprudent for the 
Alliance to implement its declaratory policy on the "open door," before it assesses the impact of the first round 
of enlargement. From the NATO perspective, the Washington Summit decisions on ESDI were milestones. At 
Washington, the Allies went much further, agreeing to support operations led by the European Union where 
NATO was not engaged. Building on NATO’s work with the EU, the Allies have sought the closest possible re-
lations with the EU, to prevent the divergence of security interests, to minimize duplication of capabilities, and to 
ensure that non-U European Allies have a meaningful decision-shaping role in EU deliberations on European se-
curity and crisis management. NATO enlargement should become a normal process, not an exceptional one, until 
all qualified European democracies have the opportunity to join.  
To establish for NATO-EU ad hoc working groups on security, Headline Goal implementation, EU access to 
NATO assets and capabilities, and permanent NATO-EU consultation mechanisms. In addition, Feira recognized 
explicitly the offers of capabilities by non-EU Allies, specifically Turkey, Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Norway, in support of future EU-led operations. Agreement on a role for NATO defense experts in analyzing re-
quirements for the Headline Goal to help ensure the developments in agenda of the 2002 and the long-term ful-
fillment of the Headline Goal.    
However, the enlargement processes, especially the European Union’s, have been explicitly defined as being 
open once provided the interested countries meet all the required pre-defined criteria for accession, the develop-
ment of regional co-operation might provide for the economic, political and security conditions which would help 
meet the criteria for accession.  The European Union’s attractiveness and influence in the Balkan and former East 
European countries after the fall of communist regimes stem from the hope that at some future date, it will open 
its gates to the countries of the region. For the countries of the region, integration within European political and 
security organization such as European Union, Western European Union and NATO remains the main objective. 
Regional co-operation was then perceived as the main limit to integration within broader security frame-
works, especially since it was feared they might be considered as a substitute to integration, which would either 
impede or delay accession. More promising may be a combination of regional projects and structures with pro-
spects and preparation for integration into a larger Europe, meaning first of all European Union, but also the other 
European countries, meaning those which wish to join E.U. and will be at different stages of preparation, as well 
as the Ukraine and the Russian Federation which have special partnership relations with E.U.          
While EU leaders took some welcome steps in these areas at the June 2000 Summit in Feira, Portugal, con-
siderable work remains. From the NATO perspective, the Helsinki EU summit in December 1999 was encourag-
ing, especially on the issue of capabilities. The highlight of the Helsinki Summit was the so-called “Headline 
Goal,” through which the EU nations committed themselves to create a pool of 50.000-60.000 troops capable of 
moving within weeks to a crisis area, and sustaining and conducting an operation for up to a year. Since one key 
to the success of ESDI is capability, this Headline Goal is a very important indicator of the EU’s serious intent.  
According to a recent Euro-barometer opinion poll, fewer than 30 percent of EU citizens believe enlarge-
ment should be a EU priority. This spring, the German chambers of industry and commerce issued a report con-
cluding that none of the 10 Eastern and Central European countries seeking to join the EU would be ready before 
2004. This would be two years after the date EU leaders set at their summit in Helsinki last December for entry of 
the best-qualified applicants [6].   But there is a real politic opportunity to join with Euro- Atlantic vision which 
continue almost sharing more than 56 years common values while there is still a peace to keep: All these changing 
strategic realities mean reflecting cooperative structures of the EU and NATO. Because, still unless the Europe 
change its defense policies will continue to depend on the transatlantic logistic, C4-I devices but the most im-
portant airpowers and nuclear force capabilities.  
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The EU’s need for NATO support – in terms of defense and force planning, as well as access to assets and 
capabilities, gives all Allies, including the six, some leverage in establishing the mechanisms for NATO-EU co-
operation. If NATO and the EU can find practical solutions to the unfinished business at hand- capabilities, insti-
tutional links and the participation of non-EU Allies in the EU’s work-then this can be the start of a healthy, twen-
ty-first century marriage [7]. US Foreign Secretary Cook said both he and Secretary Powell had agreed that "an 
increase in Europe's rapid reaction capability could strengthen NATO and we are both determined that this new 
European capacity shall be firmly anchored in NATO." Powell said the Bush administration has a very good un-
derstanding of what ESDI is all about, and that if it is "firmly embedded in NATO and we're not duplicating plan-
ning capabilities ...then there's no reason to see this as destabilizing NATO in any way." On the European securi-
ty, I absolutely accept that it is important that we devise a model, which does not involve duplication. Duplication 
is wasteful [8]. 
3. REEVALUATE THE ONGOING PARAMETERS OF THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE 
PROJECT:    
The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) project is an ambitious attempt by the United States to develop a system 
to counter the possible launch of ballistic missiles by rogue states. The National Missile Defense (NMD) element 
of the project, however, has alarmed Western European governments. European Defense discusses the major de-
bates and looks at the implications of NMD to European and world security. Like many EU states, Russia, China 
and Canada are also arguing that NMD will contravene existing treaties such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, START II and the future START III. All have expressed fears that NMD will fuel a new arms race as 
states attempt to increase their ballistic missile armory and develop newer missiles capable of saturating and evad-
ing NMD. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and with ways and means to improve tactical missile defense. TMD 
was high on the agenda, since the Gulf War of 1991 had demonstrated how big a difference a missile threat can 
make under such a tense situation.  
They assured the Russians of this intention by repeatedly using the language that the ABM-Treaty was the 
“cornerstone of strategic stability” between the U.S. and Russia. Yet, here is the paradox: In spite of during 
Cold War, nuclear missiles one of the most important were a European reactions to US plans for National Mis-
sile Defense (NMD) so far were have been predominantly negative. For example, German Defense Minister Ru-
dolph SCHARPING adding that, “the principle of arms control and non-proliferation must not be changed” [9]. 
Also, in the different exceptionalism argued by the French President Jack CHIRAC called America’s “ Attempt at 
domination in international affairs” [10]. As the French Chief of Staff, General Jean-Pierre Kelche, put it, NMD 
was “...the road of pessimism, the road of abandonment of nonproliferation, which was at the heart of our com-
mon policy, the policy of the international community” [11]. Even stronger words were used by French President 
Jacques Chirac, who argued that National Missile Defense was “...of a nature to re-trigger a proliferation of 
weapons, notably nuclear missiles. Everything that goes in the direction of proliferation is a bad direction.” [12] 
Nonetheless, most in Western Europe will closely watch to see whether Bush will continue the work of the 
Clinton administration by addressing the new challenges in European security alongside his Western European al-
lies. As French Prime Minister Lionel JOSPI N had put it: „We have never been in favor of such an initiative, 
since it seems to us capable of upsetting the strategic balance we [sic!] have managed to maintain until now...” 
[13] He was echoing what the British Chief of Defense Staff, Sir Charles GUTHRIE, had stated earlier:  “What I 
think we have to do is talk to the Americans, the rest of Europe has to talk to America, and make quite sure that 
the balance of destruction in the world is not made worse by this...“[14] This argument could have been heard at 
various places during the past two years. It is indicating that there was stability wrought about by a fine-tuned sys-
tem of mutual deterrence that has proven to be better than any other instrument. NMD would upset this formula, 
and consequently it was a French observer who said that the acronym NMD should be spelled „no-more-
deterrence” [15].  
On the Russian side, of course, in contrary to Bi- polar Super Power arms race, cannot achieve new strate-
gies for re- armament policies since rising financial and lack of high-technology measures comprising with US 
side.  Absolutely, this strategy continues with losing prestige and declining failed to develop meaningful military 
reforms. In other words, on the one hand Russia has the huge military infrastructure, which Russia inherited 
from the Soviet Union, and the limited budget, which we spend on defense today. On the other hand, as a result of 
same reasons, they cannot create a correct balance between the tremendous nuclear posture and weak in modern 
conventional field. It is not a secret that economically Russia cannot afford to maintain its nuclear forces either at 
the level of the START-I, or the level of the START-II Treaty, which has not come into force after all due to the 
production rate of its new missiles. Most of Russia's other long-range missiles have either passed their service life-
times. In other words, since economic and technologic problems Russia has no choice but to radically reduce the 
number of deployed nuclear warheads and to downsize nuclear modernization programs. The Strategic Missile 
Forces, which still control the bulk of Russia's strategic triad, are going to loose their status as a separate armed 
service. But it is not clear whether these plans would actually be implemented in the absence of the arms control 
regime. Also, final disaster of Kursk Nuclear submarine in North Sea illuminated one more time existing securi-
ty problems of Russian nuclear forces. In contrary to, on the other side of the proliferation of the NBC weapons 
brings faces from the China- India- Pakistan and at the other side Middle East Iran- Syria- and China entered a 
new dynamic tripartite competition. In this context, there are some of the new proposals between the Turkey-
Israel-US common missile defense arguments considering changing nature of ballistic missile.  
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However, US formal authorities think differently from the European, Russia and Chine sides. Rumsfeld said 
when the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972 technologies and the circumstances in the world were notably differ-
ent. “The Soviet Union – our partner in that treaty – doesn’t exist anymore,” he said. “We’re in a very different 
world. … The principal threat facing the United States is not the fear of a strategic nuclear exchange with the 
Soviet Union.” The secretary also said the Russians “have to know” that the kind of missile defense capabilities 
the United States proposes do not threaten them in any way. “They also have to know if they look around the 
globe that there are other threats,” he said. “There are nations with increasingly capable weapons, that because 
of the proliferation of technologies are posing threats not just to the United States but to countries in Europe and 
ultimately Russia.” [16] The most important advantage of the NMD project that goes along with absolute deter-
rence capability both overkill and detect its location with new threats and risks posed by using ballistic missile 
states. 
4. TURKEY’s CONTRIBUTION TO CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 
PHENOMENON: 
Turkey demanded the right for full and equal participation in any operation directly related to its own security 
issues, so that problems regarding the participation of Turkey in the European Security and Defense Identity 
(ESDI) could be resolved. However the EU did not favor this proposal. What are the Turkey’s side main argu-
ments about the ESDI?  First, if a crisis situation breaks out in a region near Turkey and the EU wants to inter-
vene in the situation, this will affect Turkey's security. Secondly, Turkey in peacetime wants to have continuous 
consultation with the EU, to participate in military maneuver’s, to have representatives in political and military 
committees and to discuss probable crises. Thirdly, in crisis time Turkey wants to have equal and full participa-
tion right to the planning and the operation phases when NATO capabilities will be used. In time of war, Turkey 
wants to have strategic administration and political control rights in operations carried out with NATO resources.  
Turkish public opinion considering what will happen and will we stay on back of the European door forever 
with living economic problems. That time Turkey asking again the possible new roles. We hope that both of US 
administration and EU decision makers once again should carefully review the situation, and finally will establish 
a consensus considering non – EU Allies critical positions including Turkey, which this possible document should 
benefit for every actors vital interests.   
Also, all these efforts are increasing the tendencies USA-Israel-Turkey Trilateral Alliance relations more 
than European side. But Turkey, using his geo political advantages and in around the Black Sea, Caucasus and 
Balkans. Today, Turkey under the good cruise line enhanced relations with Greece in the Aegean side. In parallel 
to this trend relationship with Georgia, Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Bulgaria in good shape.  But, the most important ris-
ing development is Black Sea littoral states cooperation not only in Black Sea Economic Cooperation dimen-
sions, but also Black Sea Force activation’s with Russia-Ukraine-Georgia-Bulgaria-Romania-Turkey for enlarge-
ment peace and stability in principles of PfP and OSCE .On the other hand, Turkey attracting from the South Ko-
rea, Japan and China cooperation proposals for defense industry modernization projects. This reality shows Tur-
key’s multi-axes geopolitical and economy-politic possible choices.   
5. CONCLUSION   
Good governance and democracy, as the new organizing principles of global security, will promote the kind 
of relationship between states that takes account of divergent interests but eliminates the use of force as a means 
of settling conflicts of interests. Since, it has no correctly established democratic decision & planning mechanisms 
for security policies and the Warsaw Pact couldn’t continue his mission as a rival to embryonic “international 
collective community,” under the NATO flag. There is a powerful possibility to imagine creating double defense 
systems in limited narrow standards for the near future, should be created new different strategic blockades.  
However, also another possibility continue to progress toward a harmony of interests between the NATO and 
EU, with lifting politic and economic barriers, continuing cultural and military rapprochement’s on the model of 
the cooperation which bring peaceful platforms.  
US secretary of defense Ramsfield stressed that in Munich, our European allies and partners know that NATO 
is at the heart of Europe’s defenses. Therefore, to sustain our past success into the future we must first and fore-
most maintain NATO as the core of Europe’s security structures for Europe. Weaken NATO and we weaken Eu-
rope, which weakens all of us. We and the other nations of the alliance are bound together in pursuit and preserva-
tion of something great and good, indeed, something without parallel in history. Our greatest asset still lies in our 
values – freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. And in the face of shared risks, we still 
must share the responsibility [17]. 
But, Turkey always opens the door to European dialogue since its geopolitical and cultural choices not only 
today from the Ottoman Empire modernization tendencies Young Turks. Turkey, every time prefers same as 
Ataturk Western civilization aims and principles in Republic of turkey state. We just live in democracy and uni-
versal western values. Yesterday, Ambassador Karen FOGG stressed on living with democracy and liberal 
economy principles. Yes, it’s true. EU consolidates the Spain, Portugal and Greece democracy. But remember 
that, we were in democracy trends in this time. Also, NATO enhanced Turkish democracy and its institutions. All 
these developments increased the European democracy. Yes, Turkey understands its              problems and home 
affairs. But, all these issues have to be reciprocal mentality. We try on to increase our efforts to improve our 
standards in democracy and liberal economy. From a geopolitical perspective, the world in which war might erupt 
with healthy democracies, economic growth, sustained peace and stability deal with the realities of the struggle to 
replace totalitarianism. This is not an easy task, for the broaden strategic perspective Europe has clearly entered a 
 6 
new security era since the mission remains of NATO is far from the complete and ESDI has to as part of compre-
hensive architecture for un-divided security visionary self determination on the whole continent of Europe.   
 
  Table 1 : Defense expenditures of NATO countries 
Tableau 1 : Dépenses de défense des pays de l'OTAN 
  Country 
                / 
                   Pays 
Currency 
unit   / 
Unité 
monétaire 
(million) 
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999e 
(0) (-) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Current prices and exchange rates   /   Prix et taux de change courants 
Belgium Belgian francs 70899 115754 ##### ##### 131156 131334 131796 133007 136393 
Czech Republic Czech ko-runy // // // // // // // // 41484 
Denmark Danish kroner 5355 9117 13344 16399 17468 17896 18521 19079 19577 
France French francs 55872 110514 ##### ##### 238432 237375 241103 236226 244029 
Germany Deutsche mark 37589 48518 58650 68376 58986 58671 57602 58327 59730 
Greece Drachmas 45936 96975 ##### ##### 1171377 1343276 ###### ###### 1853189 
Hungary Forint // // // // // // // // 182106 
Italy 1000 Ital-ian lire 3104 7643 17767 28007 31561 36170 38701 40763 41888 
Luxembourg 
Luxem-
bourg 
francs 
836 1534 2265 3233 4194 4380 4797 5197 5460 
Netherlands Neth. guilders 7119 10476 12901 13513 12864 13199 13345 13561 13676 
Norway 
Norwe-
gian kro-
ner 
4771 8242 15446 21251 22224 22813 23010 25087 25074 
Poland Zlotys // // // // // // // // 12675 
Portugal Escudos 19898 43440 ##### ##### 403478 401165 418772 420654 448690 
Spain Pesetas . 350423 ##### ##### 1078751 1091432 ###### ###### 1185942 
Turkey 
1000 
Turkish 
liras 
33 203 1235 13866 302864 611521 ###### ###### 4367663 
United King-
dom 
Pounds 
sterling 5571 11593 18301 22287 21439 22330 21612 22551 22283 
NATO - Eu-
rope 
US dol-
lars . #### #### ### ##### ###### #### #### ##### 
Canada Canadian dollars 3360 5788 10332 13473 12457 11511 10831 11168 11048 
United States US dol-lars 88400 138191 ##### ##### 278856 271417 276324 274278 283096 
North America US dol-lars 91704 #### #### ### ##### ###### #### #### ##### 
NATO - Total US dol-lars . #### #### ### ##### ###### #### #### ##### 
1990 prices and exchange rates   /    Prix et taux de change de 1990 
Belgique Francs belges 132418 158789 ##### ##### 115966 114228 113002 112522 113805 
République 
tchèque 
Couronne
s tchèques // // // // // // // // 12626 
Danemark Couronnes danoises 14095 15622 15759 16399 15524 15562 15652 15653 15610 
France Francs français 171903 198895 ##### ##### 214675 210675 210939 204751 210279 
Allemagne 
Deut-
sche-
marks 
60568 64021 66139 68376 49024 48256 47077 47233 47950 
Grèce Drachmes 510756 524576 ##### ##### 610416 647663 681584 740737 772385 
Hongrie Forint // // // // // // // // 37737 
Italie 1000 lires 22048 23289 26608 28007 24702 24882 24622 25207 25090 
Luxembourg Francs 1645 2232 2488 3233 3630 3758 4025 4315 4510 
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luxem-
bourgeois 
Pays-Bas Florins 10996 11769 13037 13513 11469 11650 11560 11427 11254 
Norvège 
Couronne
s nor-
végiennes 
14153 16135 19712 21251 19809 20014 19713 21010 20230 
Pologne Zlotys // // // // // // // // 1697 
Portugal Escudos 259215 217934 ##### ##### 274531 264795 269183 259663 270742 
Espagne Pesetas .. 862375 ##### ##### 828568 812567 819486 798016 828902 
Turquie 
1000 li-
vres tur-
ques 
6801 8567 9336 13866 15344 16402 17263 17913 18956 
Royaume-Uni Livres sterling 21848 22092 24576 22287 17060 17138 16107 16397 15807 
OTAN - Eu-
rope 
Dollars 
EU .. #### #### ### ##### ###### #### #### ##### 
Canada Dollars canadiens 8527 9442 12537 13473 11410 10378 9686 10047 9842 
Etats-Unis Dollars EU 213125 224685 ##### ##### 240529 229094 227867 221927 225112 
Amérique du 
Nord 
Dollars 
EU ##### #### #### ### ##### ###### #### #### ##### 
OTAN - Total Dollars EU .. #### #### ### ##### ###### #### #### ##### 
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